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I. REBUTTAL ARGUMENT 
In his brief, Respondent Jerry Judd (hereinafter referred to as "Judd") addresses 
issues raised by Appellant Kootenai County (hereinafter referred to as "the County") in 
its opening brief, and also presents argument on additional issues. This reply brief will 
provide additional argument on the issue concerning the District Court's decision 
regarding augmentation of the record in the appeal below, and will otherwise be limited 
to rebuttal on the additional issues which Judd has raised. 
A. There was no basis for the District Court to augment the record in the 
appeal below under Idaho Code§ 67-5276. 
For the reasons stated in its opening brief, the County disagrees with Judd's 
statement that Rule 84(1'.) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to the 
motion for augmentation of the agency record which the District Court granted in the 
appeal below. Judd does correctly point out, however, that Idaho Code§ 67-5276 also 
applies to the District Court's determination as to whether an agency record may be 
augmented with additional evidence. This statute, which was cited in the County's 
opening brief, reads in its entirety as follows: 
67-5276. ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE. (1) If, before the date set for 
hearing, application is made to the court for leave to present additional 
evidence and it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the additional 
evidence is material, relates to the validity of the agency action, and that: 
(a) there were good reasons for failure to present it in the proceeding 
before the agency, the court may remand the matter to the agency with 
directions that the agency receive additional evidence and conduct 
additional factfinding. 
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(b) there were alleged irregularities in procedure before the agency, 
the court may take proof on the matter. 
(2) The agency may modify its action by reason of the additional evidence 
and shall file any modifications, new findings, or decisions with the 
reviewing court. 
Idaho Code § 67-5276. 
The County has pointed out in its opening brief that the lacaboni application is 
not material to judicial review of the decision of the Kootenai County Board of 
Commissioners (hereinafter referred to as "the Board") in this matter, and does not 
relate to the validity of that decision: Nevertheless, even if this Court were to find that 
the application was material and did relate to the validity of the Board's decision, the 
District Court still erred in granting Judd's motion to augment the record because it 
failed to follow the plain language of Idaho Code§ 67-5276(1 ). 
If the evidence sought to be added to the record via a motion to augment is found 
to be material and is also found to relate to the validity of the local governing body's 
decision, the reviewing court must then find that "there were good reasons for failure to 
present it in the proceeding" before the local governing body. Idaho Code § 67-5276. 
Here, Judd argues that this is the case because the Jacaboni matter had not been 
decided at the time the decision in this matter was made, but this is actually one of the 
reasons why the District Court should not have augmented the record with the Jacaboni 
application. The Board made its decision in this matter before it had even had the 
opportunity to consider the evidence relevant to the lacaboni variance application. 
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Even if this Court were to uphold the District Court's finding that there were good 
reasons for failure to present the lacaboni application in this proceeding, Idaho Code 
§ 67-5276(1) unambiguously states that the proper action would have been to "remand 
the matter to the [Board] with directions that the [Board] receive additional evidence and 
conduct additional factfinding."1 This was not done here. Instead, the District Court 
itself received the additional evidence and conducted the additional fact finding, which 
was clearly improper. If the District Court believed that the lacaboni decision was 
relevant to this matter, it should have remanded this matter to the Board with 
instructions to reconsider its decision in light of its subsequent decision in /acaboni. The 
failure of the District Court to do so requires, at the very least, that its decision in this 
matter should be vacated. 
B. The decision of the Board was supported by substantial, undisputed 
evidence in the record. 
Judd's brief emphasizes the argument that there was no evidence supporting the 
Board's decision to deny his variance application. To the contrary, the Board's decision 
in this matter was supported by substantial, undisputed evidence in the record before it. 
That evidence showed that Judd had built structures within twenty-five feet (25') of the 
- shoreline of Lake Coeur d'Alene without first obtaining a variance or a building permit, 
both of which were required for construction to take place. The Board found that, based 
1 Judd does not appear to be arguing that the /acaboni application would be relevant to whether there 
were alleged irregularities in procedure before the Board in this matter. See Respondents' Brief at 11-13. 
If that were the case, the District Court could have directly taken and considered such evidence, as 
provided in Idaho Code§ 67-5276(1 )(b). 
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on this evidence and particularly due to the proximity of the encroachment to the 
shoreline of Lake Coeur d'Alene, that Judd had failed to show that the requested 
variance would not be in conflict with the public interest. 
The District Court recognized that these facts were undisputed, but then 
inappropriately acted as a finder of fact in finding that those facts were not relevant in 
determining whether the proposed variance was, or was not, in conflict with the public 
interest. (See Dist Ct. Tr. p. 49 L. 5 through p. 51 L. 25.) Under Idaho Code§ 67-
6516, however, this is a determination left to the discretion of the Board - not to the 
District Court on judicial review. See Marcia T. Turner, L.L.C. v. City of Twin Falls, 144 
Idaho 203, 211-12, 159 P.3d 840, 848-49 (2007) (pointing out that use of word "may" 
imparted discretion to governing board in granting or denying permits). This discretion 
allows a local governing body to deny a permit application even if no one testified 
againstit. Id. at 212, 159 P .3d at 849. 
Thus, contrary to Judd's arguments and the District Court's findings, the record is 
not devoid of evidence supporting the Board's decision in this matter. The evidence is 
present, but the District Court simply ignored it in making its own decision, improperly 
substituting its judgment for that of the Board. That decision would paradoxically 
require the Board to approve a variance application as a matter of law whenever the 
structure which was the subject of the variance has already been unlawfully built, while 
allowing the Board the discretion to deny such a variance request if the structure has 
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not yet been built. Therefore, the decision of the District Court should be vacated, and 
the decision of the Board should be affirmed. 
C. The Board did not deprive Judd of procedural due process, nor was its 
decision based upon unlawful procedure. 
Judd also argues that the decision of the Board was based upon unlawful 
procedure, based on excerpts of the transcript of the Board's public hearing in this 
matter which have been reproduced in his brief. None of these excerpts, however, 
show that the Board denied due process to Judd, nor do they show that the decision of 
the Board was based on unlawful procedure. 
Judd's argument is based on an alleged denial of due process resulting from the 
Board's decision to obtain information from the Kootenai County Assessor's Office 
concerning whether the Judd property was classified as "buildable" or "non-buildable" 
for assessment purposes. (See Combined Tr.2 p. 35, L. 17 through p. 37, L. 23; p. 40, 
L. 2 through p. 41, L. 25; p. 44, L. 23 through p. 47, L. 13.) This information was 
requested of staff after the public hearing was initially closed and the Board had 
commenced with its deliberations, when the Board indicated that it wanted to ascertain 
whether Judd had been placed on notice as to any limitations on the lawful use and 
development of the property which may have been reflected in the Kootenai County 
Assessor's valuation. (Id.) 
2 For the sake of consistency with the references cited in Respondents' Brief, citations to the transcript will 
refer to the transcript of the hearings held before the Board in this matter and in two other matters heard 
simultaneously (Wohr/e and Baycroft) on June 1, 2006, in their entirety. This transcript was filed with the 
District Court on January 23, 2007. References to this transcript will use the abbreviation "Combined Tr." 
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After obtaining the document pertaining to the Judd property, the Board briefly 
read and discussed it. (Combined Tr. p. 40, L. 2-24; p. 41, L. 1-19.) Upon advice of 
counsel, the Board then re-opened the public hearing in this case in order to officially 
admit this document into the record and to afford Judd an opportunity to review the 
document and provide a response. (Combined Tr. p. 41, L. 20-25; p. 44, L. 23-25; p. 
45, L. 1-6.) Judd did in fact respond. (Combined Tr. p. 45, L. 7 through p. 47, L. 3.) 
This process was completed in one day in large part as an accommodation to Judd, 
who had come from Spokane, Washington to be present at that hearing. (Combined Tr. 
p. 36, L. 8-12; p. 37, L. 1-8.) In so doing, Judd did not object to the Board's 
consideration of that document at that time, and did not request additional time for 
rebuttal. (See Combined Tr. p. 45, L. 7 through p. 47, L. 3.) 
Idaho case law is clear that consideration of a variance request involves the 
quasi-judicial function of a local .. governing body, where due process requirements 
apply. See, e.g., Evans v. Cassia County, 137 Idaho 428, 432-33, 50 P.3d 443, 447-48 
(2002). Judd has cited Chambers v. Kootenai County, 125 Idaho 115, 867 P.2d 989 
(1994), in support of the contention that he was denied due process as a result of 
introduction of new evidence. 
Chambers involved a decision made after considering evidence not introduced 
into the record at a public hearing. Chambers, 125 Idaho at 118,867 P.2d at 992. The 
Chambers Court stated that a governing board, when conducting a quasi-judicial 
proceeding considering a zoning-related issue, must a) provide notice of meetings 
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where the matter is considered, whether the meeting is a public hearing or a meeting for 
deliberations, b) provide a transcribable verbatim record of the proceedings, and c) 
make specific findings of facts and conclusions upon which the decision was based. Id. 
These requirements also imply the opportunity to present and rebut evidence. Id. 
This case, however, may be distinguished from Chambers. In Chambers, the 
county commissioners had based their decision at least in part on evidence which had 
not been received during the course of any public hearing. The Court found that this 
had served to deny the right to notice and an opportunity to respond to the new 
evidence. See id. Here, the Board re-opened the public hearing in order to admit 
additional evidence into the record and to give Judd the opportunity to review that 
evidence and provide an opportunity to respond - the very due process rights to which 
the Chambers Court stated they should be entitled. 
A court reviewing a decision ofa local governing body under the Local Land.Use 
Planning Act, Idaho Code§ 67-6501 et seq., is required to "consider the proceedings as 
a whole and to evaluate the adequacy of procedures and resultant decisions in light of 
practical considerations with an emphasis on fundamental fairness and the essentials of 
reasoned decision-making." Idaho Code§ 67-6535; Evans, 137 Idaho at 433, 50 P.3d 
at 448. In this case, the Board was not acting upon a cold appellate record to make its 
decision; rather, it heard the application in a de nova proceeding and was the original 
deciding body, as hearing examiners in Kootenai County act strictly in an advisory 
capacity. See Kootenai County Code§§ 2-1-2(G), 2-1-3(0). In that capacity, the Board 
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received testimony and evidence in addition to that considered by the hearing examiner 
(including Judd's testimony, and evidence introduced by, or favorable to, Judd). 
Judd also argues that certain comments by then-Commissioner Gus Johnson 
constituted a deprivation of due process because they deprived Judd of a meaningful 
opportunity to rebut those comments. First of all, it must be noted that Judd was given 
the opportunity to respond to those comments, and did not request additional time to do 
so. Secondly, it appears that Judd is actually arguing that these comments indicated 
that then-Commissioner Johnson was not acting in an impartial manner, as required in 
quasi-judicial proceedings of a local governing body. 
This Court has defined "impartiality" as "the lack of bias for or against either party 
to the proceeding." Turner, 144 Idaho at 209, 159 P.3d at 846. On the other hand, 
"impartiality" does not mean "lack of preconception in favor of or against a particular 
legal view," nor .. does it "guarantee each litigant a chance of changing the .[decision 
maker's] preconceived view of the law." Id. "Impartiality" simply means that a decision 
maker is "willing to consider views that oppose his preconceptions," and to remain 
"open to persuasion." Id. Furthermore, a member of a local governing body cannot be 
deemed to lack impartiality simply because he or she "has taken a position, even in 
public, on a policy issue related to the dispute, in the absence of a showing that [he or 
she] is not capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own 
circumstances." Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 785, 86 P.3d 494, 499 (2004) 
(quotations omitted). 
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Here, there is no showing that then-Commissioner Johnson was incapable of 
fairly making a decision in this matter on the basis of its own circumstances - he simply 
requested additional information which had not been provided by staff, explained why 
he had requested that information, and gave Judd an opportunity to respond. 
(Combined Tr. p. 35, L. 17 through p. 37, L. 23; p. 40, L. 2 through p. 41, L. 25; p. 44, L. 
23 through p. 47, L. 13.) In addition, the Board's ultimate decision to deny Judd's 
variance request did not turn on the assessment of the property as a "buildable" parcel 
or as a "non-buildable" parcel. (AR. at 180-84; Combined Tr. p. 53, L. 7-25; p. 54, L. 1-
23.) As discussed above and in the County's opening brief, there was other substantial 
evidence presented at the hearing upon which the Board based its decision even if it 
had not considered the document derived from the Assessor's records. In addition, as 
discussed above, interested persons were provided a fair opportunity to present and 
rebut .this evidence once the public hearing was reopened. Cf. Evans, 137 Idaho at 
433, 50 P.3d at 448. 
For these reasons, the Board's decision was not based upon unlawful procedure, 
and the District Court stopped short of finding that a deprivation of Judd's due process 
had occurred. (See Dist. Ct. Tr. p. 49, L. 12-18.) Therefore, the decision of the District 
Court should be vacated, and the decision of the Board should be affirmed. Even if this 
Court were to find that this portion of the proceeding were procedurally defective, the 
Board's decision should nevertheless be affirmed because the reasoning behind the 
Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the remainder of the record. 
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D. Judd is not entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal. 
In its opening brief, the County argued that this Court should vacate the District 
Court's award of costs and attorney fees to Judd in the appeal below. As stated in that 
brief, the same arguments apply to Judd's request for this Court to award attorney fees 
to Judd on appeal. 
These arguments may be summarized as follows. First, Judd should not be 
considered a prevailing party for the reasons stated in this brief and in the County's 
opening brief. Secondly, the Board acted with a reasonable basis in fact and law, thus 
precluding an award of attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code§ 12-117 even if 
Judd were deemed to have prevailed, or to have prevailed in part. 
For these reasons, as set forth in detail in the County's opening brief and as 
summarized here, this Court should decline to award attorney fees on appeal. 
II. CONC.LU.S.ION 
Idaho Code § 67-5276 did not provide a basis for the District Court to grant 
Judd's motion to augment the record in the appeal below because it was not material, 
did not relate to the validity of the Board's decision in this matter, and because good 
reasons for failure to present ii in the proceeding before the agency did not exist. Even 
if a basis existed to augment the record, the District Court erred by failing to remand this 
matter to the Board for further consideration in light of its decision in lacaboni. 
The decision of the Board was supported by substantial, undisputed evidence in 
the record, consisting of the unlawful building engaged in by Judd before coming to the 
10 
County for forgiveness, when Judd should have come to the County beforehand for 
permission in the form of a variance, and then a building permit. The District Court 
ignored this evidence, and substituted its judgment for that of the Board, in finding that 
this evidence could not provide a basis for the Board's decision. 
The Board did not deprive Judd of procedural due process, and did not make its 
decision based upon unlawful procedure, in obtaining and considering additional 
evidence not initially provided during the course of the public hearing held in this matter 
and allowing Judd to respond to that evidence. This is particularly true because this 
information was not the Board's primary consideration in making its decision, and 
because then-Commissioner Johnson's comments do not support a finding that he was 
not acting as an impartial decision maker. 
Finally, Judd should not be awarded attorney fees on appeal because it should 
not beJound to be. the prevailing party in this appeal. Even if Judd were.found. to be. the 
prevailing party, Judd should not be awarded attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code 
§ 12-117 because the Board acted with a reasonable basis in fact and law in making its 
decision in this matter. 
Dated this ~c'Y111._ day of April, 2008. 
Kootenai County Department 
of Administrative Services 
Patrick M. Braden 
Attorney for Appellant 
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